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[L. A. No. 23791. In Bank. Mar. 2, 1956.}

PEARL C. HOPKINS, Appellant, v. GUY B.
HOPKINS, Respondent.
[1] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Enforcement.-A divorce decree of
a sister state incorporating a property settlement agreement
requiring the husband to pay a certain sum in lieu of all
payments of alimony and support money and byway of support
and maintenance of the parties' children, but not segregating
the amounts attributable to the wife and to the children, was
not, after the children reached majority, so uncertain as to be
incapable of enforcement in California, since the courts of
this state could, without first resubmitting the decree to the
court of its origin for modification, determine the proportion
of the total support obligation attributable to the wife. (Disapproving Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 819 [268 P.2d 151].)

[2] ld.-Foreign Decrees-Modifl.cation.-Wbere a divorce decree
of a sister state incorporating a property settlement agreement
required the husband to pay a certain sum in lieu of all
[1] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 312 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 740 et seq.
MeX. Die. References: [1, 2] Divorce, § 305 j [3] Divorce, § 203.
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payments of alimony and support money and by way of support
and maintenance. of the parties' children, but did not segregate
t.he amounts attributable t.o the wife and t.o the children, the
wife's contractual right to receive her proportionate share of ,
the monthly payment under such decree, after the children .
reached majority, was not subject to modification by the Supreme Court of California or by any other court.
[S] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of .rreement of Parties.Where a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree requires the husband to pay a certain sum in lieu
of all payments of alimony and support money and by way
of support and maintenance of the parties' children without
segregating the amounts attributable t.o the wife and t.o the
children, and also provides that in the event the wife should
remarry the husband's obligation should be limited t.o the
proportionate part of the monthly payment that is "reasonably
necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of their
said children as long as said children or any of them remains
a minor," the meaning of the quoted provision may be ascertained by looking t.o the subsequent acts and declarations of
the parties.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Alfred L. Bartlett, Judge. Reversed.
Action to collect accrued arrearages under a divorce judgment of a sister state. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Courtney A. Teel for Appellant.
George B. Bush for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action in September
1950 to collect the accrued arrearages not barred by the
statute of limitations (see Hopkins v. Hopkins, 116 Cal.A.pp.
2d 174 [253 P.2d 723]) under a 1927 Colorado decree of
divorce, which incorporated a property settlement agreement
providing that defendant should pay to plaintiff "in lieu of
all payments of alimony and support money, and by way of
support and maintenance for the first party [plaintiff] and
their said minor children, the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($150) per month ... " in addition to certain lump811ID payments that were to be made within three years from
the date of the decree of divorce. The property settlement
agreement also provided that "If the first party hereto
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[plaintiff] shaH at any time remarry, such re-marriage on the
part of the party of the first part shall relieve second party
[defe!!.dant] from the payment of any further alimony to the
first party. But such marriage, if any such takes place, shall
not relieve the party of the second part from the payment to
the first party of such proportionate part of the monthly
payments hereinbefore provided for as shall be reasonably
necessary for the support, maintrnance, and education of their
said children a.c; long as said children or any of them remains
a minor and in the custody of the first party." In the present
action, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the
Colorado "Judgment and Decree sought to be sued upon is
too uncertain to be sued on and is unenforceable in California"
(c/. Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 819, 824 [268 P.2d 151]),
and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
The uncertainty is said to arise from the fact that the
property settlement agreement specifies a gross amount for
the support of the wife and children, without segregating the
amounts attributable to each, and that since the children have
all reached the age of majority, defendant's obligation is limited to the support of plaintiff, who has not remarried.
Relying on Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Ca1.App.2d 819, 823-825 [268
P.2d 151], defendant contends that the California courts are
"without power" to determine the proportion of the total
support obligation attributable to plaintiff, and thus that
defendant's obligation cannot be enforced in California until
plaintiff obtains a determination by a Colorado court of the
proportion of the total support obligation attributable to her.
[1] In the Kahn case the court said that "if a wife seeks
to recover the unpaid installments on her decree from another
court and the amount of her award is the combined sum of
alimony and child support and her children have attained
their majorities and the court is unable to determine the
portion intended for alimony as distinguished from the part
allowed for child support, then the entire award of such decree
is illegal and nonenforceable. [Citations.] The judgment in
suit can serve no purpose unless it is first resubmitted to the
court of its origin for modification." (123 Cal.App.2d at
824.) The California cases cited as authority for that statement do not support it. (See the review of those cases in
Wilkins v. Wilkins, 95 Cal.App.2d 605, 607-611 [213 P.2d
748]; see also Anderson v. Anderson, 129 Cal.App.2d 403,
406-407 (276 P.2d862] [following the Wilkins case and dis-
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tinguishing the Kahn ease as applicable only to actions on
sister-state alimony and support decrees].) Furthermore,
although the present case differs from the Kahn case in that
defendant's obligation has its origin in an integrated property
settlement agreement rather than in a judicial award of
alimony and in that there was evidence presented to the trial
court that would enable it "to determine the portion intended
for alimony as distinguished 'from the part allowed for child
support," the rationale of the holding in the Kahn case is
inconsistent with Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Ca1.2d 465 [283
P.2d 19], and must therefore be disapproved. In the Worthley
case this court rejected the contention that a prospectively
and retroactively modifiable sister-state support decree is too '
uncertain to form the basis of an action in this state for a
money judgment, and we held "that foreign-created alimony
and support obligations are enforceable in this state. In an
action to enforce a modifiable support obligation, either party
may tender and litigate any plea for modification that could
be presented to the courts of the state where the alimony or
support decree was originally rendered." (44 Cal.2d at 474.)
[2] Plaintiff's contractual right to receive her proportionate share of the $150 monthly payment under the Colorado
decree is not subject to modification by this or any other
court (Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117 Colo. 296, 298-299 [186 P.2d
583] ; Hall v. Hall, 105 Colo. 227, 235-239 [97 P.2d 415];
ct. Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 40 [265 P.2d 873]), and
the crucial question presented to the trial court in the present
case was to resolve the ambiguity latent in the property settlement agreement by determining the proportion of defendant's
obligation attributable to plaintiff. (See Meek v. Meek, 51
Ca1.App.2d 492, 495 [125 P.2d 117) ; Putnam v. Putnam, 51
Ca1.App.2d 696, 699 [125 P.2d 525J.) This proportion is
indicated in part by the provisions of the property setth,ment agreement itself for it is provided therein that in the
event plaintiff should remarry defendant's obligation should
be limited to the proportionate part of the monthly payment
that is "reasonably necessary for the support, maintenance.
and education of their said children as long as said children
or any of them remains a minor . . . " [3] The meaning
of this provision may be ascertained by looking to the subsequent acts and declarations of the parties (Barham v. BaHi;am.
33 Ca1.2d 416, 423 [202 P.2d 289], and cases cited), of which
there was evidence presented in the trial of the present case.
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The trial court should have made a finding on the basis of
that evidence and entered judgment accordingly.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Dooling, J. pro tem.,- con·
curred.

)

SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
I am of the opinion that the trial court properly entered
judgment for defendant, and that said judgment is in accord
with the decision in Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 819 [268
P.2d 151]. I would not disapprove the Kahn case, as does
the majority opinion; and while the case of Worlhley v.
Worthley,44 Ca1.2d 465.[283 P.2d 19], cited in the majority
opinion, is not directly in point, I adhere to the views ex·
pressed in my dissenting opinion in that case.
I would affirm the judgment.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March
28, 1956. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Schauer, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted. Dooling,
J. pro tem., participated therein in place of McComb, J.

• A.asi~ed by Chairman of Judicial Councn.

